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Summary  findings
On January 12, 1994, the CFA  franc  - the currency  of  primary  surplus requirement,  and no borrowing to
the thirteen African  states of the CFA Franc Zone - was  finance  current spending).
devalued  50  percent. The event had been expected  for  *  Sanctions  on errant states should be imposed
some time, but the magnitude  and one-shot nature of the  through reduced access  to borrowing.  Central-bank and
devaluation  posed problems  for members  of the zone's  at least some foreign  borrowing  should be conditional  on
two monetary  unions.  mecting  the annually  agreed-upon  targets.
Devarajan  and Walton conclude  the following,  among  *  The central banks' ability to impose  these sanctions
other things,  about what has happened:  should be strengthened,  possibly  by channeling  a portion
- Inflation  has been substantially  lower than in most  of foreign  credit going to the zone through the central
developing  countrics,  but the mechanisms  of  banks. Technical  assistance  may also help.
macroeconomic  discipline  have been inadequate,  *  Insulation  can be effected by ensuring  that quasi-
especially  for Fscal  discipline.  The recent crisis has its  fiscal  deficits are explicitly  financed  by country budgets,
roots in failures  of fiscal  discipline  as much as in the  reversing  the recent trend to internationalize  them by
constraints  on zestoring  competitiveness  because  of the  having  the BCEAO  finance  part of the national banks'
fixed parity.  portfolio  problems.
* The transmission  of inflation  across  states has not  *  The current size of the eluasi-fiscal  deficit (and hence
been a problem in the past,  but could be more of one in  the future earnings  position) of the two central banks
the future with the common  nominal shock, the  should be assessed  early and put on the budgets of the
temporary loss of the French franc  as an anchor, and the  various national governments,  with allocation based on
rising importance  of supranational  quasi-fiscal  deficits.  the original source  of the problem. If necessary,
* For macroeconomic  coordination, it is appropriate  additional measures  should bc undertaken  to secure a
to continue relying  on a mixture of rules and discretion  strong capital base for the'central banks.
and not on thc market, at least in the medium  term. The  *  Exit from the zone is best discouraged  by securing
20-percent rule has been inadequate  in the past and  the zone's credibility.  It should also be clear that those
should be supplemented  by annual targets for fiscal  that exit because  of macroeconomic  problems  will not
performance  (including  deficit-to-GDP  ceilings,  a  have  easier  access to international  sources  of finance.
This paper  - a product of the Public  Economics  Division,  Policy  Research  Department  - is part of a larger  effort in the
department to study structural  adjustment  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World
Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Carlina Jones, room N1O-063,  extension  37699 (19
pages).  June 1994.
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Richard Westebbe  for comments  on an earlier draft.On January  12, 1994,  tho CFA  Franc-the currency  of the thirten African  states  comprising  the CFA  Franc
Zone-was  devalued 50 percent'.  While the event had been expected for some time, the magnitude  and
one-shot"  nature  of tie devaluation  pose  a new  set of problems  for toe members  of the zone's two monetary
unions.  Unles  properly managed, the change in the CPA Franc's parity could undemin  the credibility
of the zone's monetary  and exchange  rate standards,  negating  a major benefit of zone membership  and
possibly threatening tho very existence of the  monetary unions'.  Avoiding this outcome requires
mechanisms  that  prevent  problems  in one country  from  endangering  the monetary  union-that is, mechanisms
of macroeconomic  coordination. While  coordination  is always  important  in a monetary  union, it becomes
especially  relevant  in toe wake  of a devaluation.
The CFA zone served its members  well, with low iflation  and relatively  high growth, untl the
tubulence and  loss of competitiveness  of the 1980s  (the  seeds  of which  were sown  in the commodity  booms
of the 1970s). This was achieved  in a world otherwise  fill of capital  controls  and flexible  exchange  rates.
The zone  continued  to confer  low inflation  in the tubulent 1980s,  even  while  the loss in competitiveness  and
financial  discipline  contributed  to a deepening  economic,  financial  and human  crisis.  As the rest of the
world moves towards open capital accounts  and fixed exchange  rates in the  1990s, the CPA zone's
convertible  currency  and  strong, independent  Central  Banlks  should  prove  even  more  valuable  commodities.
A large, one-shot  devaluation  of the CFA  Franc  was the best means  of preserving  the benefits  of the
zone at a new but still fixed currency  rate while  restoring  competiveness  in the member  countes.  But
secuing a large, real depreciation  (many  estimates  suggest  50 percent  in local currency  terms is required)
is tough enough for  a single country.  At a minimum it requires sound fiscal and monetary policy and
measures  to prevent the maxi-devluation from triggering  a wage-price  spiral.  Is it more difficult  in a
currency  union? After  the devaluation,  could  the excesses  of some  members  be exported  to the rest of the
union,  jeopardizing  the success  of the whole  enterprise?
The answers  to these  questions,  and  the related  policies  to accompany  a large  devaluation  of the CPA
Franc, depend  on three sets  of issues:
(a) how  to keep  members  of the union  on the macroeconomic  straight  and narrow;
If and when this fails,
(b)  how to insulate  the whole unon from the problems  of errant states, so that fiscal (or other)
problems  in one  county do not magnify  problems  in the central  bank, and  paripassu in other countries;  and
(c) how  to do so in a manner  that  discourages  exit  from  the union  by states  suffring macroeconomic
difficulties. Not only would  this be a permanent  loss to the exiting  state, it could  damage  the credbility of
the zone  as a whole.
'100  pert  in local currency terms.
2 Thmrughout this papa,  we  will refer to the  CPA Zon  as the thteen  Afican  counli  whih  use the CPA  Fran  as their
acncy,  recognizing that  he  countri  belong to two diffrent  monetry  unuom, namedy,  UMOA and the menber  of BEAC.
Whie most of the poles  we advocate apply to the CFA Zone, ty  ar  aimed  at preservg  and strngteing  each of the two
unions. Most of the disousion and data will concrn  BCEAO, UJMOA's  centalb  aloug  a number of poin  apply to BEAC.
Fmally, note that Como  also uscs a currency caled the CFA Frnc  but sinc  it has its own control bank, none of  e coordinaion
ues raised  here  apy  to i2
These are perennial  questions  that have always  been  relevant  to the zone.  They are particularly
important  in the aftermath  of a devaluation,  since  the major  price shock  could  spark union-wide  inflation.
The recent  history  of the CPA  Zone  suggests  it is highly  unlikely  ta  every  country  will follow  exemplary
macroeconomic  policies  after  a devaluation.  Some  will  be susceptible  to added  instability  that  could  threaten
the success  of a devaluation.
This paper reviews  the history of the relationship  between zone-wide  controls and national
macroeconomic  management,  assesses  the  risks  of added  instability  after  a devaluation  and  outlines  solutions
to reduce these risks.  We draw on parallels  with the debate  on the European  Monetary  Union in our
conclusions  on coordination  in the CPA  zone.?
Current Mechanisms  for Enforcing  Macroeconomic  Disciplne
The monetary  unions  in the CFA zone  have  used  two  methods  to enforce  macroeconomic  discipline:
(i) annu,  country-specific  credit  allocations  issued  by the two union-wide  central  banks;
(ii) the rule that central  bank credit  to any government  cannot  exceed  20 percent  of that country's
previous  year's fiscal  receipts.
Thus, the zone  uses  a mix  of discretionary  and rule-based  mechanisms.  The  credit  allocation  is the
province  of every  central  bank,  and  in the  case  of the CFA  zne,  is  practiced  dtough the bank's refnancing
facility. The "20 percent  rule is necessitated  by the fixed  parity of the CFA  Franc. Without  a rule like
this, governments  could  finance  their  deficits  by monetization  at will. The ensuing  inflation  would  dran the
zone's  foreign  exdhange  reserves,  maing the fixed  excange rate  unsustinable. Note that  the 20 percent
rule links central  bank credit  to a government's  revenue  performance,  thereby  reducing  the possibility  of
deficits  in one country  spilling  over into another.
How effecive have these methods  been in practice? At one level, they have been remarkably
successful  at maintaining  macroeconomic  discipline  in the zone. The fixed  parity  was preserved  for over
45  years. The membership  of  the two  monetary  unions  has changed  verylitle.  Maurtaniahas  left and  Mai
has joined  UMOA;  Equatorial  Gi,nea has joined  ihe BEAC  Zone.  ilation in the CFA countries  has been
considerably  lower than in their Afifcan  neighbors! Looking  more closely,  however,  we find that the
discretionay  mechanism  has not  always  been  applied  to promote  macroeconomic  stability. Meanwhile,  the
20 percent  rule has proved  an increasingly  ineffective  mechanism  for overall  fiscal  discipline.  Not  only  has
the  rule been  openly  broken  by some  countries,  but  several  governments  have  found  indect means  of  getting
around  the ceiling.  That  the zone  found  itself  in a crisis  in the 1990's  is only  partially  attributable  to adverse
3We  ae concrned here with one set ofreons  for suppoting cser  inter-country  relations:  the potential  fr  th  tw  monetary
unions  to support  macroeconomic  stbiity  and credibility.  This is distinct frm  other motvations for regionalism,  including  the case
foram  optimal  currency  urem  and a customs  union. The CFA countris do not have  ny offthe characteristics  of an opfimal  currey
area: they fac  differnt tading strucus,  and so hoe differential  terms of td  shocks; they trade much less with each other than
th icrst of the world; and factor mobiliy amongst  the countries  is quite imperfect Reducing intrnal  bariers  will help economic
efficiency,  but the major  i from trade will be from reduced  barers  to trade with the principal exernal  trading partnes.  Internal
hbecalization  should  be designed  to spur, and not substitut for, extral  liberaizaon.  Monetary  igation  makes  sense  in the zone
counties icndecntly  of inter-county liberaEIzatio,  but can also form one part of an overU program  of strengthened  intgrin.
4  Sec Daraja  and de Melo (1991), Boughton  (1991).3
external  shocks. It is also testimony  to the fact that the disciplinary  mechanisms  have been inadequate,
especially  in times  of boom  and  bust.
The central  problem  is the weakness  of fiscal controls. The 20 percent rule restricts  government
borrowing  from the central  bank  only;  there  are no limits  on either  foreign  or other  domestic  borrowing  by
governments.' Furthermore,  it applies  only to di=et lending  from the central  bank to the governments.
The limit  does  not apply  tu govermnent  guaranteed  borrowing,  nor to government  loans  which  commercial
banks rediscount  with  the central  bank. CFA governments  have made  use of these  unrestricted  instruments
to finance  public  expenditares.  As  Tables  1 and 2 show,  in some  years,  net foreign  borrowing  exceeded  net
domestic  borrowing  (central  bank plus other domestic  borrowing)  by a  actor of two or three.  More
recently,  the governments  of Cote  d'Ivoire, Senegal,  Cameroon,  Gabon  and Congo  have run wears  with
the domestic  banking  sector. Finally,  as their  revenues  have  fallen,  many  goverments (Cameroon,  Congo,
Cote d'Ivoire, Togo)  have not been in a position  to repay  outstanding  debt, resulting  in a violation  of the
rule.  In addition,  some  countries  (Benin,  Niger)  have  been granted  exceptions  to the 20 percent  rule due
to  uparticularly  difficult" circumstances.
Foreign  borrowing  is limited  by a country's  creditworthiness  or, in the case  of low-income  countries,
by concessional  aid flows. The debt crisis  has taught  us that  both of these  are fickle  sources  of discipline.
In the CFA  zone  there appear  to have  been  greater  opporunities  for larger  countries  to borrow  abroad  (often
due to "loan-pushing'  by commercial  banks  or the enthusiasm  of export  credit  agencies)  until the problems
of the 1980s  revealed  how  precarious  the underlying  position  of these  countries  were. Note from Tables 1
and 2 that Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal  borrowed  from abroad  the most, both in absolute  terms and as a
percentage  of government  expenditures.  To the extent  that  runaway  fiscal  deficits  in the large  countries  are
more  likely  to have  zone-wide  consequences,  this loophole  in the 20 percent  rule is particularly  worrisome.
Domestic  borrowing  (other  than from the central  banks)  does  not directly  threaten  price stability,
but it has a perverse  effect  on the central  bank's own  liability  position  and  income,  and hence  on the zone's
coherence. The banking  systems  in COte  d'Ivoire and Senegal  are in a crisis.  This is partly due to the
decliningprofits  of theprivate  sector,  squeezed  between  an overvalued  exchange  rate  and  domestic  recession.
It is also a consequence  of the arrears  which  the govermments  of these  two countries  have  been  running  with
the financial  systems  and private sectors. The governments  have aen  steps to restructure  the banking
systems  by absorbing  some of the bad debts, but the net effect  has been  to worsen  the income  position  of
the  BCEAO. For example,  in Cote  d'Ivoire,  the banks  received  govemment  paper  in exchange  for their  bad
debts-which they  could  then  rediscount  with  the BCEAO  at an interest  rate  of only 3 percent. In effect  the
BCEAO  has absorbed  some  of the costs  of bad debts  that have  their roots in part in the fiscal  deficit  of a
member  country.' But  the BCEAO  liability  is shared  by all the member  states. Thus, COte  d'Ivoire's and
Senegal's  financing  part of their fiscal  deficits  by arrears  to the private  sector  has led to the export  of these
countries'  deficit  to the union  as a whole. Note that  these credits  fiom the BCEAO  to the governments  do
not come  under  the 20 percent  rule, again  demonstrating  the rule's porosity.
5One  example  of the kate loophole is scasonalcaop crdis-whicb  in some countries  became a defacio  form of public-setor
finanfc as public-soctor  marketng agencies accumulated  substantial  dcbL
'There  ae,  of course, othr sources of the banking sectors' potilio  problems, including  the low pmfitbiLy  of an  enterpris
scctor hit by recession and dcelining  compeliveness.4
Having  established  that  theo nule part of CFA discipline  leaves  much  tD be desired,  we consider
now the "discretion"  part, namey, credit  allocation  by tho centra bank.  Credit  is allocated  to countries
annually  based  on their  estimated  credit  demanid  and  the central  bank's  reserve  position. The credit  demand,
in turn, is built  up from inflation  and real-output  targets. In this way, credit  allocation  in the CFA zone
closely  resembles  the monetary  pro  ng  exercises  conducted  by the International  Monetary  Fund.
However, monetary programming exercises are undertaken for individual counes  whereas each central
ban's  credit  allocation  is to members  of a currenc union. If capital  wert perfectly  mobile  across  countries
in the union, it would  not be possible  to sustain  different  credit  and inflation  targets (i.e., differt  real
interest  rates) across  the countries. Since  capital  is not perfectly  mobile  in the CFA zone, though,  it is
possible  to view credit  allocation  as country-specific  monetary  progrmmng exerciseo.  The recent  reforms
in the operation  of the money  market  In UMOA  permit  the central  bank to manage  credit  allocation  on a
week-by-week  basis  (using  the interest  rate  as an instument). In practice,  however,  this  market  has not  been
widely  used in the zone and some  "coarse  bming"  of credit  allocations  is still  necessary.
The CFA zone's  track  record  of low, long-term  inflation  would  suggest  that  credit  management  bas
been  consistent  with  non-inflationary  money  growth  over the long  n.  But  the central  banks  bave  not  been
able  to prevent  temporary  bursts  of inflation,  especially  those  driven  by expansionary  fiscal  policy  following
a commodity  price  boom. It is also noteworthy  tha over 90 percent  of the low-interest  agricultural  export
credit  has gone to C&te  d'Ivoire  and Senegal,  further  emphasizing  the bias in subsidizing  resources  to the
luger countries  (Table  3).  A similar  problem  has occurred  with loans  to fledgling  public  enterpises in
UMOA  countries. To the extent  these  have contributed  to the portfolio  problems  of the banking  systems
of these  countries,  the  burden  has been  intrnationalized  by BCEAO,  with  the "tax"  spread  over the  whole
union.
The Tran  ion  of Economic  Problems Across  States
We now  trn  to the  potential  implications  of the large  devaluation.  Will  such  a nominal  shock  strain
the mechanisms  of macroeconomic  management  and  coordination?
In low-inflation  countries,  large  nominal  devaluations  have  often  led to large  real  devaluations  with
only  a moderate  and  temporary  acceleration  of inflation. 7 The absence  of an inflationary  history  means  an
increase  in the price level after a devaluation  is less likely to get transmitted  into an indexation-  or
expectaions-driven  spiral. However,  this  is  by no means  guranteed: it depends  on the underlying  economic
conditions  supporting  the return to low inflation. Monetary  policy  that does not acco  such a
permanent  acceleration  is a necessary  condition. But tO recite  the need for tight money  is of little help.
Underlying  this are  two more  findamental  factors:  the fiscal  position  and wage  management.  Usually  both
fiscal  contraction  and real-wage  reductions  are necessary  in the short  rua to support  a swift reun  to low
inflation  with  new  relative  prices. Low-inflation  countries  which  neglect  these  precepts  (Mexico  in the early
1970s  is a good  example)  find  their  devaluation  triggering  ajump  first  to moderate  and  then  to high inflatio
The CFA zone has thirteen countries.  Even with the benefit of a history of low inflation, the
effective  management  of a devaluation  represents a macroeconomic  and political chalenge to each of them.
The probability of some going off course on either fiscal management  or real wage policy must surely be
high.  This raises the two questions  that are at the center of this note: Can the institutions  of the two  unions
Sce Ktud  (1992).be used  to help reduce  the probability  of individual  countries'  going  off course? And, if some  do, can tho
whole  union  be Insulated  from  such failures  in some  countries?
In prindple the issues  apply  equally  to each  country  in the zone. But  failures  in the  core' countries
in each union-COW  d'lvoire and Senegal  in UMOA  and Cmneroon  and Gabon  in BEAC-would be
parcularly costly, at a minimum  in terms of the propordon  of th  population  affected  by filure,  and
potenially  In terms  of greater  spillover  effects. Furthernore,  failure  in the core  countries  would  me  that
the whole  exercise  might  have  to be repeated. Fily,  as we have  seen,  the larger  countries  in UMOA  have
experienced  laer  discipline  and have  contributed  more  than  their share  to the union's problems.
We therefore  now  examine  potential  trasmision mechanisms  of infladon  between  states,  starting
with  a review  of what  past  experience  in the zone  tells  us about  their importance. The  next  section  proposes
some  solutions.
As in individual  countries,  for inflationary  acceleration  to be sustained,  it would have to be
underwritten  by the monetary  policies  of the central  banks. Each  of the central  banks  draws  up a financial
program  that essentially  accomm  s nominal  output  growth  in individual  countries,  and allocates  money
and credit  growth  accordingly.  It is probably  realistic  to assume  that the central  bank lacks  the power  to
force a severe credit  crunch  on individual  countries:  it can lean against  the wind  of ongoing  inflation,  but
not go totally  against  the state  of markets  and wage  and price  movements.  There are  then  two mechanism
by which  inflationary  acceleration  in one  country  can be transmitted  to otiers, and so to the whole union:
through  wage  and  price movements  in one  country  directly  affecting  changes  in another  (dtat  are then  largely
accomdatd  by money  and credit  policy)  or through  the  transmish  an  of underlying  problems,  such  as the
ineationalization of fiscal  or quasi-fiscal  deficits. We look  at each  in turn.
Diet  trawmission  of wage  wadprce movements
Are wage and price movements  quickly  equalized  aross  the member  countries  of the CFA?
Completely  free movement  of goods  and factors  of production  would  assure  this. In the absence  of perfect
factor mobility,  the prices  of tradeables  would  still  be expected  to converge  (except  for differences  in each
county's basket  of tradeable  goods  and  differential  movements  in the intemational  prices  of these  goods)
but those  of noradeables would  respond  to domestic  market  conditions,  so that overall  inflation  may  not
be synchronized.  The historical  evidence  bears  out this reasoning. There is indeed  a common  pattern  in
price  movements:  inflation  has been  in the range  of zero  to eight  percent  for most countries  for most of the
time in the  past three  decades,  with  a tendency  to accelerate  in the 1970s  and  decelerate  in the 1980s. Yet,
significant  differentials  remain,  between  France  and the members  of the two zones and among  the zone
members.
Past  work suggests  that  the best way  to characterize  inflation  in the CFA zone  is the following:
* an imperfect  overall  association  of inflation  across  countries,  either  between  France  and the CFA
zone  members  or amongst  zone  members;
in technicda  terms.  both Honohan  (1990)  and Booaa  and Devarajan  (1993)  rejcted  co-integation (dtat  is evidene of inflaion
following  a common  path to a signifcant extent)  between Franc  and CFA  counrie.  The la  study  aso rejoctod  co-ingration
bdwoen the two core countries  and each odter  and the smaller countres, wth the single exception  of Cote dIvoire and Burina,
Paso.6
* a common  core  of Inflation  between  the CFA zone  members  and France,  that can be Interpreted
as a common  tendency  of zone  members  to converge  to the French,  or international  inflation  rate;
* divergences  from  this core, sometimes  substantial,  explained  by country-specific  factors.
Inflation  patterns In 1976-a  particularly  turbulent  year-illustrate.  In UMOA, Cfoe d'lvolre
experienced  an inflationary  burst from  S to 10 percent  per annum,  when  French Inflation  was 4 percent  and
falling. This  can largely  be explained  by the investmentboom  that  followed  the coffee  and cocoa  price  gains
in COte  d'lvoire. However,  with  the possible  exception  of Burkina  Faso, thre is littlo  evidence  of this  being
transmitted:  inflation  was flat in Senegal  and falling in Togo.  Sinilarly in BEAC  in 1976, Cameroon
experienced  a major deceleration  of inflation  whie Congolese  inflation  was rising.
Analysis  of the differential  between inflation  in zone countries  and France also confirms  that
correlations  of this  differential  are weak,  variable  and  sometimes  negative. In other  words,  an inflationary
acceleration  in one country-taking  it above  core inflation-has not, in the past, tended  to spill  over into
inflation  in another.
This  pattern  is further  confirmed  by the behavior  of wages.  While  labor  institutions  and  wage  policy
in CFA countries  are interrelated,'  and  there is a tradition  of labor  movement  for both  skilled  and  unskilled
work, there are substantial  wage  differentials  across  states  (Figure  1). Futhernore, there is litde evidence
of wages  moving  together  (Fable  4).  These  observations  must  bc qualified  by the fact  that our knowledge
of this area is still  quite  limited. The need  for further  research  is especially  acute.
Nevertheless,  the evidence  so far appears  to be reassuring.  There  has been  little  direct  transmission
of price  or wage  inflation  across  frontiers. Divergences  from  the core  rate  are primarily  due  to local shocks,
and a fuller analysis  would  show  that macroeconomic  conditions  and the tightness  of product  and labor
markets  in individual  countries  were  the principal  factors  in explaining  such  differences.
Fiscal  and quasi-fiscal  deficits
It is clear that fiscal and public-sector  wage management  is central to moderating  inflation  in
individual  countries. Fiscal policy is also undoubtedly  important  in explaining  divergences  of country
inflation  rates  from the core inflation  rate of France: increased  spending  puts  pressure  on the markets  for
domestic  goods,  and increased  wages  directly  raises  inflation.  Does  this  raise  a federalist  issue? Can fiscal
laxity  in one country  lead  to the transmission  of inflation?
At one  level,  this comes  back  to the  same  issue  as before:  if fiscal  difficulties  lead  to an acceleration
of inflation  in one country,  there is some  risk that others  will follow. As  just discussed,  this appears  not
to have  been  irnportant  in the past.
Where  the federalist  issue  enters  is through  the actual  and potential  quasi-fiscal  deficits  of the two
central  banks. A quasi-fiscal  deficit  is equivalent  to the losses  of the central  bank. In the 1980s,  economists
came to  realize that it was necessary  to think of such losses as part of the government's  deficit.
Characteristic  sources  of such  deficits  were  foreign  exchange  losses  (in  Yugoslavia)  and  banking  losses  that
were  taken  over  by the central  bank  Cm  Chile). They  are called  'quasi-fiscal'  deficits  since  they  are a public
Iln  C&t d'lvoirc, some salria-notably  thosc of tcachs-ac  linked to levels in France-7
soctr  liability  that has, In the end, to be financed,  just as a fiscal  deficit. Thoy  are financed  either  by
monetary  creation  or credit  creation,  boti of which  have  inflationary  consequences.  The issue  is gormae
to the Franc  Zone  boeauso  the central  bank are supra-national  while  goverment budget are national 10.
In UMOA  and BEAC  ther  are two potential  sources  of quasi-fiscal  deficits, that could be of
Importance  In the wae  of a devaluatLon;
*  foreign  exchage losses;
e banking  system  losses  that  are financed,  in part, by the central  bank.
Foreign  exchange  losses  have,  of course,  been  negligible  in the past  because,  outside  the operations
account  (which  is In French Francs), the central banks do not hold foreign currency 11. They could
potentially  be large after a devaluation.  The position  is different  for the two central  banks, largely  as a
consequence  of differing  conventions  on who  bears  the foreign  exchange  risk  of IMP loans. In UMOA,  the
central  bank is in principle responsible,  and consequently  faced significant  losses immediately  after a
devaluation.  Tn  practice,  it appears  that BCEAO  was able to get the member  governments  to support  the
losses. In BEAC  the risk is passed  on to governments,  who would  automatically  bear the losses. The
appropriate  principle  in this  area is that  the  govenment  bear  the risk  of the  IMF  purchases  it made  and such
losses  have  to be budgeted  for. That  is, governments  will  need  to have  a larger  primary  surplus  (or smaller
deficit)  to finance  the larger liability  as a consequence  of these losses. The approach  in BEAC  has the
advantage  of making  country-upecific  obligations  both  transparent  and  automatic.
Banking  system losses,  which  have  been steadily  rising in the zone during  the 1980's, form the
second  potential  source  of quasi-fiscal  deficits. The losses  flow  from three factors:  a worsening  enteprise
portfolio  in the wake of the recession  and the declining  competitiveness  of some firms; the rise of
arrears-directly  to the  banks  or to enterprises,  especially  from  govenments  (notably  in COte  d'Ivoire);  and
the weakening  deposit  base  as capital  flowed  out  in the expectation  of a devaluation.  As  noted  above,  there
has already  been a tendency  to deal  with these  losses  by effectively  passing  them  on in part to the centrl
bank.  In Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal,  the governments  absorbed  the banks' bad debts, giving them
goverment paper in reurn.  In COte  d'lvoire,  the banks  refinanced  this government  paper with  BCEAO,
at an interest  rate of 3 percent. The net result  is that  BCEAO's  income  position  could  turn negative. The
situation  calls  for a careful  assessment  of the central  banks' capital  position  with  a view  towards  solving  their
income  problem,  possibly  by recapitalization.
HOw  wil these be affected  by the devaluaion?
Direct  transmission  of infationary  accelerations  across  states  has been weak  in the past, but there
is the contmiing  and possibly  worsening  problem  of supranational  quasi-fiscal  deficits. Both could  be
affected  by the devaluation.
1 MThc  issues  discussed  in tIis sub-action arc procisely  the mame  as those being considcred in the contet  of a fuU  economic
union of the UMOA  and BDAC  Zone stats.  While hannonirtion  of fiscal  policies wiUl  be necessary  for the economic  union, the
point madc here is that it is essential  even before that-to  ensure the succcas  of a devaluation.
" AR CPA members  are a tquired to have at kast 65 percent of their foreign  assets in Frcnch Franca  in te  Opeations Account
with the French Treasury.  Most hold more than this,  although  thcre is some evidence  that  Cameroon  put a large pa  of its oil
surplus  in US assets.S
In the aftermath  of the devaluation,  all tho countries  are experiencing  the same  inital pricw t shock,
and a temporary  but large  divergence  from French  inflation.  The anchor  of French  inflation  is temporarily
gone-for  both t.  monetary  authorities  and the public.  Everyone  expects short-run  inflation  to  be
substantially  above  tho past. There may  be a propensity  to look at tih Initial  change  In tho exchange  rate
as a yardstick  to adjust  domestic  prices. There may  also  be a tendency  for the smaller  countries  to look  to
the core CFA  countries  in each  Union  for leadership  In setting  'ages  and  prices. Under  these condidon
It Is imperative  to flnd  an alternatve  anchor  for the  movement  of nontraded  goods  prices. Tho  best candidato
Is changes  In tivil service  wages. Of course,  beyond  the short (or very short)  run, it is important  that the
CPA countries  move  back  to a situation  where  the French  Franc  Is the nominal  anchor  in the system.
The impact  on quasi-fiscal  deficits  would  be mixed. On  the foreign  exchange  side,  it depends  largely
on who holds  the liability  for  public  loans  (notably  IMF  purchases).  As to financial  setoDr  losses  (that  will
potentially  be transmitted  to the central  banks)  the situation  is unclear.  Some commercia  banks have
significant  foreign  exposure,  but its value is unclear. With  Ivorian  external  commercial  debt  trading  at less
than 10  percent  of face  value  in the secondary  market,  it appears  that  market  valuations  of this  exposure  have
already adjusted  downwards  substantially. Indeed, some recent studies indicate  that for commercial
enterprises  in UMOA, foreign exchange  assets exceed liabilities. Enterprise  profitability  will change
depending  on the activities  of firms-producers  if tradeables  will do much  better, importers  and producers
of noutradeables  will suffer: It will also depend  on the overall  state of the economy. Finally,  liquidity  will
depend  crucially  on whether  capital  retr.  This strengthens  the case  noted  above  for exercising  caution
in any takeover  of fincial  sector  problems  by the central  bank.
solutions
(I)  To the macroeconomic  coordintion problem
The ouestion  of how  to achieve  maonom  ic coordination  in a federal  system  is  not unique  to the
CFA zone.  There are parallels  to the debate  on mainning  discipline  in the fifty U.S. states  as well as
among  the potential  members  of the European  Monetary  Union.  In general, dtere are three possible
mechanisms  for imposing  discipline:
market-based  - in which  the market  imposes  discipline  through  increasing  the cost of borrowing
for profligate  states;
*  rule-based  - such as a balanced-budget  requirement,  or a ceiling  on the deficit-tDGDP  ratio;
*  discretionary  -where  macroeconomic  perormance  is monitored  by an independent  or supranational
body.
The  second  and third  depend  on the adminiistrative  imposition  of some  sanction,  such as a fine or
a quantitative  limit  on borrowing.  The U.S. method  is largely  based  on the market,  supplemented  in some
states by  elf-imposed  rules.  The evidence  indicates  that the fiscal position  does influence  the cost of
borrowing,  so the market  imposes  some  discipline  (Box  1). The 'Maastricht' approach,  as proposed  for a
fiture European  Monetary  Union,  involves  a blend  of all three. Rules  are  set, but  a supranational  body  has
some discretion  in agreeing  on transition  steps and deciding  when sanctions  are imposed. Discipline  is
expected  to be imposed  both by reduced  access  to public  fimds  (e.g. from the European  Investment  Bank)
and from  the anticipated  consequences  on borrowing  costs  for a state which  is out of compliance  (Box  2).p
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For the  CPA  zone,  a markcet-based  system  is essentially  irrelevant  in the near  future. Capital  markets
in the zone are thiin  and, withi  a history  of arrears;-financing,  govenments are both  unusually  interest-rate
insensitive  and  unlikely  to face  a hard  internal  credit  constraint.  The  toCFA  monetary  unions  now  operate
a blend  of a rule-based  and discretionary  syste,  as disscussed  abovre,  but this has had major loopholes  in
the past.  The underlying  approach  however  should  be maintained. Apt!rt  from the market  element,  the
Maastricht  model  is therefiore  directly  applicable  to te  CPA  zone.
Improving  discipline  should  inolve two areas  of change:  in the rules and  in thie  sanctions.  The rules
need  to be modified  in two way.
linst, there is a need  to broaden  the coverage  from centalbank  nnce  i.e., the 20 perce2t  rule)
to all sources  of borrowing.  While  the Yamassoulro  reforms  of 1989-90  did his in large  part
for UMOA  (y  controlling  public  enteprise and  crop credit),  thie  problems  with arrears  inicate that  thiere
is still room  for furher tigening.  It is recommended  that, while  the 20 percent rule be ket  (see below)
it should  be supplemetd  by a rule based  on ovrerall  fiscal  perfonnance.  as in the Maricht  proposal. A
rule has t  enormousa  ad  n  pren  nd no  egotiable.  espite all  e problems  of
differing  sarting points  and special  conditions,  it is recommended  that  this  be the core  of the system While
the details  ofthe rule will have  to awaitDirther  analysis  of the  fiscal  patterns  in the CPA  zone, tine  approah10
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descnrbed  below provides a starting point.  The rule would be that each  state should satisfy all three of the
following:
*  a primary fiscal surplus;
*  positive savings, to ensure there is no borrowing for current spending;
*  an overall deficit target, such as Maastricht's 3 percent of GDP, to ensure an investment boom
does not become a source of indiscipline.
In each of these, the definition of the fiscal deficit should be the broadest possible, i.e.,  inclusive
of those public enterprises whose debts are implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the sktae. Furthermore,
for countries receiving concessional  loans which are earmarked for public investment, the definition  of public
expenditure should  be  exclusive  of  this  investment (although the  investment should be  scruinized
independently).  The third target will require projection of nominal GDP.  These projections should be
consistent with those used by the central banks in  their monetary progming  exercises.  Since fewcountries  have projected inflation  above  out turrn, the risks of this becoming  a source of indiscipline  are low.
Finally, as in Maastricht, there may be a case for allowing  a transition period to the agreed ceilings.
Second,  it is  recommended that the 20 perceat rule be kept,  in view of  the macroeconomic
significance  of central bank borrowing92.
In addition to the 20 perceut rule, mechanisms  need to be introduced  to ensure compliance  with the
other mles.  In particular, foreign borrowing by profligate governments needs to  be  curtailed.  IThe
international  donor community  can play a role in instilling  discipline  in this arena.  For instance, there could
develop regional sources of import finance which are jointly administered  by the central bank and an
international  agency.  It would also be desirable to provide disincentives  to arars  financing, something
which cumently  has zero financial  cost to the governments  (at  least for domestic  arrears). Reduced eligibility
to central bank financing in line with any arrears would be a way of providing  this discipline.
Needless to say, designing  new rules for the zone is easier than enforcing  them, especially  given the
track record of existing rules.  Some form of sanctions  for non-compliance,  as in the Maastricht  treay,  will
be necessary, although the details will have to await firther study.  In addition, in an analogous  vein to
Maastricht, access to credit from international  financial institutions  could  be made conditional  on the rules
being obeyed.
To carry out this role institutional  strengthening  of the two central banks should be provided, with
technical  assistance and training playing an important  role.
(i)  To the insulion  problem
It was concluded above that the principal  threat of inflation transmission  within the zone lay in the
internationalization  of fiscal and financial  problems, though with the acceleration  of short-run inflation  there
is a greater risk of direct transmission  of inflation.
The main solution to this problem is to prevent the occurrence  of quasi-fiscal  deficits of the central
banks caused  by country  difficulties. This implies  reversing  the recent practice of having portfolio  problems
of country fmancial systems being financed, in part, by the central banks (as in BCEAO foir Senegal and
COte  d'Ivoire).  The central banks should remain strong, independent  and income-earning  institutions-this
might require recapitalization-and the problems of the financial  sectors in individual countries should be
dealt with by budgetary action within each country under schemes  supervised by the central banks.  Any
other sources of quasi-fiscal deficits, such as foreign exchange losses, should similarly be dealt with by
budgetary allocations.
12The rue  may tn  out to be ovedy rsiie  n the fit  year because  of the post-devaluation  inaion  surg  Since tbe rui
constrains  borowing  to 20 percent of the previous years  rcceipts, it may prove to be difficult to maiantin  the sae  levd of rcal
govcrment  spending in the first year after the devaluation.  Howevcr, it- should be noted that most estimtue  indiate  that
government  revenues  will rise Cm  real terms)  aftr  the devaluation,  so that mantaining  the same  level of govenmeatborrowing from
the  central  bank may not be necessay.  In any event, relaxing  the 20 percent rule even for one year will require chann  the
statutes  of the cental banks, something  which is clcarly undsirable, especially  since  it may not be necesay.  The best strategy  is
for the monetary  authorities  to be aware of the possibly  rsftictive  nature  of this rule in  e  first year, and tke  appropiate deciions
on a case-by-case  basis.12
There is also a need for a rule on the financing  of existing  and new quasi-fiscal  deficits.  The
proposed  principle is straightforward:  budget  finance  should be provided  to take over such deficits in
accordance  with  their origial source. Thus  foreign  exchange  liabilities  due to foreign  borrowing  would  be
allocated  according  to the source (i.e. the debtor country),  and losses due to portfolio  problems in the
financial  sector in accordance  with their country  of origin. Where  losses  exceed  what can be allocated  in
this manner, there are two possibilities:  in accordance  with GDP, or using proportions  obtained  from
identifiable  factors.
While  financing  of quasi-fiscal  deficits  is imporant, it is equally  important  to avoid  these kinds of
losses in the future. To toe extent  that tho losses  stem  from problems  in the financial  sector-themselves
a result of the economic  recession  of the 1980's-the growth and improved  competitiveness  from the
devaluation  should  lower  the chances  of recurrece.  To the extent  they arise  from fiscal  indiscipline  among
member  governments,  the approach  suggested  here-of  relying on rules rater  than discretion,  and of
plugging  as many  loopholes  as possible-is a step in the right  direction.
(iii) To terisks  of exit
The proposed  reforms  involve  a tightening  of discipline  in the CPA  zone. There is a risk that, for
countries  unable  to comply  with the requirements,  exit will be a seductive  option,  permitting  them  to shift
to a laxer fiscal regime. There are two ways in which  the incentives  can be devised  to discourage  exit.
First, and  in the long  run most  important,  are the gains  from price  stability  and  full convertibility  conferred
by the zone.  But this will have to be earned  again in the aftermath  of the devaluation. Second,  and of
particular importance  for the transitional  period, international  resources should be lnked  to  good
performance  in the zone, so that countries  which  suffer from indiscipline  cannot  do better outside. While
they  may  be able  to achieve  temporary  gains  by resort  to an inflation  tax, they  will quickly  end  up with  both
high inflation and slow growth.  In other words, countries that feel constained by their membership in the
union  should  be made  to realize  that  they will  face much  the same  constraints  if they  left the union. There
will also oontinue  to be strog  political  pressures  to maintain  the two  unions,  but  this should  come  from the
member-  governments.  Finally,  it should  be reterated that  the strongest  incnve  not to exit  will come  from
the success  of the devaluation
Conclusion
Since  it is highly  desirable  for the membership  of the two monetary  unons to be preserved,  it was
appropriate  for the counies to undergo,  jointly, a sharp devaluation. Gains  from interal trade are small
but membership  of the unions brings one powerful  attribute  that is unrelated  to economic  structure  or
mobility  of goods and  factors:  macroeconomic  discipline. This discipline  is intimately  bound  up with  the
credibility  of the CFA zone. However  irrational  it may  seem  to have  held  on to an overvalued  currency  in
the 1980s,  the discipline  provided  by the institutions  of the zone remains  a valuable  asset. Breaking  up the
zone  makes  it less credible. So all have an interest  in staying  in  the union, and  in maintaining  the new link
to the French Franc.
This paper  has looked  at federalist  aspects  of macroeconomic  management  after a devaluation;  how
to maintain  macroeconomic  discipline  in a monetary  union; how to prevent  mismanagemen  in one state
spilling  over to another;  and how to use the istitutions of the zone to make  the devaluation  a success-13
Our conclusions  can be summarized  as follows:
*  Imlation  performance  has been substantially  better than  that of most developing  countries  in the
past, but  the mechanisms  of macroeconomic  discipline  have  been  inadequate,  especially  with  respect  to fiscal
discipline.  The recent  crisis  has its roots  in failures  in fiscal  discipline  as well  as the constaints  to restoring
competitiveness  because  of the fixed  parity.
*  Transmission  of inflation  across  states  has not been  a problem  in the past, but it could  be more
of one in the fiture with  the common  nominal  shock,  the temporary  loss of the French  Franc  as an anchor,
and the rising  importance  of supranaonal quasi-fiscal  deficits.
*  It is appropriate  to condnue  to rely on a mixture  of rules and discretion,  and not on the market,
at least for the medium  term.  The 20 percent  rule has proved  to be inadequate  in the past, and should  be
supplemented  by annual  targets  on overall  fiscal  performance  (mcluding  deficit  to GDP  ceilings,  a primary
surplus  and no borrowing  to  fince  current  spending).
- Sanctions  on sates should  be imposed  through  reduced  access  to borrowing. Central  bank and
at least some  foreign  borrowing  should  be conditional  on meeting  the annually  agreed  targets.
- There is a need to strengthen  the cental banks' hands in imposing  these sanctions,  possibly
through  channeling  a portion  of foreign  credit  going  to the zone  through  these  institutions,  and additionally
through  technical  assistance.
Insulation  can be effected  through  ensuring  that quasi-fiscal  deficits  are explicitly  financed  by
country  budgets,  reversing  the recent  trend to intemrationalize  them irough fiancing part of the national
bank's portfolio  problems  by BCEAO.
There should  be an early assessment  of the current  size of the quasi-fiscal  deficit  (and  hence  the
future eamings  position)  of the two central  banks and this put on the budgets  of the various national
governments,  with allocation  based  on the original  source  of the problem. If neceary  additional  measures
should  be undertaken  to secure  a strong  capital  base of the cental banks.
*  Exit  from the zone  is best discouraged  by securig the credibility  of the  zone.  This will have to
be supplemented  by ensuring  that  those that exit becmse  of macroeconomic  problems  do not have  easier
access  to international  sources  of finance.14
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France," Canadian  Journal of Development  Studies, 1992.Table 1.  External Financing  of Government  Expeudit  (billion  CFAF)
(and as proportion of total gover_  expenditure %)
Burkina  Faso  COte  d'Ivoire  Niger
1976  0.8  31.8  5.8
-(4.0)  (14.0)  (16.4)
1977  2.3  52.4  6.3
(7.6)  (13.8)  (14.8)
1978  2.5  82.0  9.9
(7.6)  (16.4)  (17.0)
1979  1.0  99.3  14.3
(2.5)  (16.5)  (20.2)
1980  - 113.2  21.6
(18.5)  (21.9)
1981  4.3  169.6
(9.0)  (27.3)
1982  3.5  190.6
(6.1)  (29.8)
1983  4.5  143.4
(8.4)  (22.5)
1984  5.4  193.0
(9.9)  (29-3)
1985  - - -
1986  - 81.7  57.7
(15.4)  (39.5)
1987  - 66.5  55.2
(12.1)  (38.4)
1988  - 207.2
(23.5)
Notes:  1.  Data  for Benin,  Mali,  Senegal  and  Togo  not available.
2.  t-  implies  not available.
Source: BCEAO. Raport  Annuel, various.Table 2.  Govermnt  Net Borrowing:  Foreign and Domestic
(billion CFAI)
Burkina  COte
Benin  Faso  d'Ivoire  Mali  Niger  Senegal  Togo
1976  - 5.8  -
- - - 4.4  -
1977  0.89  - - 6.3  - 31.4
-0.43  - - 2.9  - 8.9
1978  1.80  - - 9.9  - 55.4
2.07  - - 4.3  - 5.7
1979  2.46  - 134.7  14.3  - 23.2
0.15  - 33.6  1.0  - -1.3
1980  - 1.31  139.6  21.6  -16.9  4.2
-0.13  107.4  8.3  10.6  -0.05
1981  - 2.90  - - 6.47  6.6
4.55  - - 23.5  7.4
1982  - 4.03  - - 26.08  3.1
4.29  - - 49.6  5.4
1983  - 2.05  - - 41.7  5.6
0.76  - - 15.9  17.3
1984  - 3.35  - 32.5  - 40.6  -
4.31  - 2.5  - 23.9  -
1985  - -1.67  - 2.5  - - 2.8
-1.46  - 3.3  - 3.3
Notes: 1. In each  year, first  row is for foreign  borrowing,  second  row for domestic  borrowing.
2.  [ - I implies  data  not avaiable.
3.  Domestic  borrowing  does  not include  arrears  by government  nor public-enterprise  borrowing.
Source:  International  Monetary  Fund. International  Financial  Statistics.Table 3.  Net BCEAO Iandingto  Governmnnt and  efinancing  of AgricUlral  Credit
(billion CFAF)
Burkina  Cote
Government  Beni.  Faso  d'Ivoire  Mali  Niger  Senegal  Togo
1975  0.70  0  5.4  2.0  0  0
1976  0  0  6.2  1.0  -4.9  0.
1977  0.9  1.1  -6.9  0.7  1.0  3.
1978  0.5  2.0  -7.9  3.2  -2.3  B.
1979  0.3  2.0  20.1  3.3  -12.6  8.9
1980  3.0  2.0  45.7  6.8  -3.4  9.
1981  2.4  3.4  64.0  8.5  14.2  11.
1982  5.5  7.5  68.8  11.9  43.8  10.
1983  8.2  8.0  61.0  10.6  37.7  10.
1994  9.1  8.2  44.6  7.7  7.6  41.7  6.6
1985  11.1  9.4  109.6  9.9  8.8  34.3  13.6
1986  11.6  10.8  118.2  14.3  12.9  39.9  14.
1987  14.2  13.5  123.7  21.2  12.9  39.8  16.7
1988  14.9  17.3  125.2  26.3  12.9  39.9  17.8
1989  15.2  18.0  181.0  34.2  13.0  21.2  16.7
Agriculture
1994  0  0  63.2  2.3  3.9  4.6  0
1985  0  0.2  79.0  3.6  2.0  8.5  0
1986  1.0  2.4  82.6  6.1  6.2  20.2  0.4
1987  5.6  5.2  130.3  5.4  9.9  42.1  0.2
1988  8.7  2.4  158.1  0  7.4  64.4  1.0
1989  2.3  2.2  135.9  0  5.3  46.2  0.9
Note: 1.  Figures  for net lendig to the agridcultd sector  are availae  only for 1984  and after.
Source:  BCEAO  REM=o  ASmtud  and Notes  dInfbrmation  et Statistigmes.Table 4.  Real wage increses  in selected CFA countries,  1985-90
(in percent per annum)
Laborers  Primary  school  teachers
Benin  4  -3
Burkina  Faso  4  1
Chad  1  6
C6te d'Ivoire  0  14
Mali  -1  -8Figure  1
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